Is there anything Transrapid can do better than conventional railways?
By Reinhard Hanstein, graduate of business scienceWhen invented, railways represented a great leap in productivity, economy,
speed and safety, compared to the then usual means of transport.
In contrary to that, the oftenly claimed technical superiority of the German
maglev Transrapid is not sound and cannot stand a clear-headed assessment under
technical, economic, ecological and operational aspects.
1 Pretended advantages of Transrapid:
1.1 Lower energy consumption?
When related to an equal seating layout, Transrapid’s energy consumption is not lower, but rather higher than the energy consumption of conventional high speed trains. Due to the fixed amount of power needed for levitation and guidance, this disadvantage becomes particularly relevant at lower speeds like in short haul and local traffic.
Sources that pretend Transrapid needed less energy than ICE are oftenly based on the energy consumption figures per seat (or per passenger) while using different seating layouts. No question that such "apples-vs.-oranges"-comparisons are not useful or even insincere.
The following comparison [1] uses a scale that is independent from seating
layout: the secondary energy consumption in watt hours per square meter basal
surface on the train, related to one kilometer.
Conventional high speed trains which are lighter than the ICE 3 (like the Japanese Shinkansen class 300X) should make the energy figures look even better in favour of wheel/rail technology. While ICE 3 weighs 2,0 tons per meter [2], Shinkansen 300X reaches 1,4 t/m [4].
The omission of mechanic friction with Transrapid does not mean less energy
consumption. For levitation alone, it needs as much energy as ICE needs for
going 120 km/h [6].
Moreover, Transrapid does have an equivalent for mechanic friction: The magnetic
friction between vehicle and guideway due to eddy currents is much higher than
the sum of all mechanic friction (wheel/rail, gears, motors) of conventional
trains. Additional drag is caused by Transrapid’s linear generator (inductive
pickup) which produces the electricity foremostly needed for levitation and
guidance. Altogether, its maglev-specific drag is about 5 times higher than the
railway-related mechanic drag [12].
1.2 Higher speed?
The world record in speed accomplished by the French TGV (515 km/h), has not been beat by Transrapid. There is hardly any more „speed gap“ between advanced railways and maglevs. Both cover a similar average speed range.
Speed increases gradually lose their effect: Example: If a 100 km long line is upgraded, so the trains can go 50 km/h faster, the time-saving-effect decreases as follows:
- Speed increased from 150 to 200 km/h: 10 minutes gained,
- Speed increased from 250 to 300 km/h: 4 minutes gained,
- Speed increased from 350 to 400 km/h: 2 minutes gained.
- Speed increased from 450 to 500 km/h: 1 minute gained.
This upgrading was withheld from the Hamburg - Berlin railway line for a long time, so it wouldn’t compete with Transrapid. Obviously, Transrapid needed to be protected from competition! Now that Transrapid has failed on this relation, the railway line is about to be upgraded for ICE service.
Conventional railway technology is fast enough to compete with short haul air travel. On the new German high speed railway line Cologne - Frankfurt (which is acutely under construction), 300 km/h fast ICE3-trains will take about 40 minutes to go from Frankfurt Airport to Cologne Airport [26]. Planes need 40 minutes, too.
The fact that an 800 km/h fast jet plane on a roughly 200 km nonstop flight
only makes about 250 km/h average speed shows how little top speeds contribute
to cutting traveling time on short distances.
A maglev with 400-500 km/h that stops every 50 to 100 km (like ICE trains do in
polycentrical, densely populated Germany) would hardly be able to significantly
improve traveling time.
The conventional railway high speed train Shinkansen 300 on the Tokyo -
Fukuoka/Hakata line makes an average speed (including all stops) of 233 km/h
while going „only“ 270 km/h top speed [31].
Failed Transrapid Hamburg - Berlin was supposed to reach an average of 285-295
km/h - with 430 km/h top speed [32].
Transrapid’s speed peaks may be impressive at first glance, but lead to a disappointingly small advantage in travelling time. Compared to 270 km/h Shinkansen, it’s only 5 minutes per 100 km. The price for this neglectable time saving effect is that the energy consumption caused by aerodynamic drag more than doubles.
With raising speed, Transrapid and railways have to face the problem
that yield benefits (like shorter traveling time) decrease while yield costs
(aerodynamic drag, energy consumption, wear) increase.
Air density on ground level is 5 times higher than in high altitudes [6],
aerodynamic drag increases by square [3]. That means that velocities above 300
km/h for land transport are not worth aspiring to.
Despite that, conventional railways do manage higher speeds, not only in world record test runs. The French railways will operate their new lines (those that by now are under construction) with 350 km/h [4]. Japanese railroads already own trains for 400 km/h and aspire to regular speeds of 450 km/h [13]. At Aachen Technical University (RWTH) advanced free wheel chassis are developed that not only replace conventional bogies and thus save weight, but also allow velocities above 500 km/h [19].
We may approve or criticize speeds above 300 km/h. The fact is that we
don’t need maglevs to achieve them.
1.3 Less land use?
If the Transrapid line consists of a posted guideway, the area underneath cannot really be used due to noise, wind or dropping ice. With a conventional foundation (dams, bridges) the area used would be about the same as with railways. The failed Hamburg - Berlin maglev would mainly have been built on ground level. Finally, Transrapid vehicles are wider than railway trains and the speed with which they encounter is higher. The behaviour of two Transrapid maglevs encountering with a relative velocity of nearly 1000 km/h at a very small distance (planned to be less than with high speed railways) has never been tested.
Besides, an ICE-line could also be built on posts and pretend not to use any land.
But the most important fact is that railway lines already exist. That means
that a maglev line would lead to additional land use.
1.4 Less noise?
At equal speed, Transrapid produces a little less noise than ICE. At 250 km/h it’s 82 dB(A) compared to 86 dB(A) with ICE [21].
However, tests by the German federal environmental authority (Umweltbundesamt)
have proved that Transrapid's noise is experienced 5 dB(A) louder by test
persons than railway noise [16]. At its aimed speed (400-500 km/h), Transrapid
is noisier anyway: 92-98 dB(A) [36].
1.5 Enough passengers?
The failed maglev line Hamburg - Berlin needed (under unrealistically optimistic assumptions) 11-12 million passengers per year to recover a part of its costs (costs for the so called operating system) [24]. The biggest part of the costs, the guideway, which would have been financed by the German federal republic, would have remained uncovered, even if the „phantasy-figures“ concerning ridership had come true.
With the famous TGV Sud-Est only 7-8 milion passengers/year travel from Paris
to Lyon and back [17], though Paris and Lyon have 12,5 million inhabitants and
France is monocentrically structured.
Hamburg and Berlin count only 5,1 million people. Adding to this, Germany is
polycentrical, so traffic is much more disperse and thus harder to bundle.
Transrapid was supposed to make a miracle come true: 150% of TGV’s passenger figures with only 40% of its passenger potential!
But even then, the federal republic of Germany would not have got a return on
its investment.
1.6 Replacing air transport?
Air transport in Germany, which - according to the Transrapid supporters - is
supposed to be shifted to maglev, can roughly be partitioned into 2 categories:
1. Connections with high ridership (mainly those from Frankfurt, like Frankfurt
- Stuttgart or Frankfurt - Hannover). With these flights ICE’s travelling
times are competitive.
2. Other relations whose passenger figures are too low to justify an utterly new
transport system.
On short German national flight routes on which there is a competitive train connection too, passenger figures decreased by 44% in the first half of the nineties, whereas railways’ passenger figures increased by 48% [29]. That means that ICE is able to take away passengers from plane. Where ICE is offered, air transport no longer booms - it even goes down.
Many air routes that were named as potential maglev lines have less
passengers than a railway branch line that is in danger of being closed.
Hamburg - Berlin flights are operated with small or even tiny aircraft (B 737,
De Havilland Dash 8, Canadair Jet). In 1998 the number of flights was reduced
from 6 to 4 per working day.
Particularly grotesque in this context was the proposal to prolong the later failed Hamburg - Berlin maglev to Amsterdam and Budapest. From Hamburg to Amsterdam, there’s only 4 flights per day (Mon-Fri) by small planes (Boeing 737, Fokker 70), from Berlin to Budapest it’s only two flights with B 737 and Fokker 70. So, what should have been shifted to a maglev?
But even if there had been a sufficient potential, shifting passengers from plane to maglev would not have been a progress since Transrapid needs about as much energy as air transport does [18].
Shifting air transport was only a pretended argument. In reality, a Hamburg -
Berlin maglev would have recruited its passengers foremostly from the most
ecology-friendly and energy-efficient mode of transport: railways [25].
The number of passengers taken away from conventional railways would have been
bigger than the number of passengers shifted from air transport. So the overall
effect on ecology and energy-saving would have been negative.
Moreover, on distances above 1000 km or on routes that lead over the sea,
maglevs cannot offer traveling times that are competitive to air transport.
Unlike railways, maglevs are not able to cross the English Channel or the Great
Belt.
1.7 Better chances on export markets?
It’s hard to imagine which country should buy Transrapid since in Germany its only reason for being is promoting the competitiveness of German industry. That argument in other countries is void or even undesirable for their domestic economy.
Foreign investors seek to build up economical high speed networks and possibly integrate existing lines. That way, a fine-meshed network can be achieved with relatively little effort of building just a couple of new „backbone“-lines (like in Germany Hannover - Würzburg or Mannheim - Stuttgart).
Besides that, other countries prefer technologies that produce a ‘local content’ and employment for the domestic economy. All-made-in-Germany high tech would not have a chance.
This way, all pretended Transrapid exports have never become real.
Some words about the Japanese magnetic levitation train „Maglev“ which is often mentioned as a reason to push on Transrapid despite to its irrationality.
Without mentioning that Maglev in Japan seems to be in the same situation
like Transrapid is in Germany [23]: It doesn’t seem reasonable to compete with
„the Japanese“ in products that will be unsuccessful, particularly after
having lost the real successful products (like the German inventions telefax and
SLR-cameras or consumer electronics) to Japanese competitors.
The same disaster like in these markets now threatens german railway technology.
Japanese Shinkansen trains are superior to German ICE-trains in terms of weight,
aerodynamics, axle load etc. [4]. It shows that Japan has over 25 years more
experience in high speed railways operation (by the way: virtually free of
accidents!). German industry should try to make ICE fit for the world market
instead of dissipating with dead-end-developments and niche products like
Transrapid.
1.8 No tunnels required?
It is not true that maglevs would not need tunnels due to their climbing
ability (Transrapid: 10%). To avoid roller-coaster-effects, gradients would need
to be limited to usual extent. Railways in Germany are limited to 4% by
regulations that originate from steam age. Electric wheel/rail systems allow
much higher gradients as subways and trams prove.
At its aimed speed (430 km/h), Transrapid can only climb 4% - like conventional
railways [39]!
1.9 More safety?
Transrapid cannot make capital out of the ICE accident at Eschede - the case is quite the reverse. The german federal railway office (Eisenbahnbundesamt) as the approval authority urged Transrapid’s manufacturers „to verify certain risk factors principally“. What’s meant is the danger of stator coils (which are mounted to the guideway) loosening and quoining in the small gaps between guideway and vehicle [35]. The Transrapid test line at Lathen had to be closed by the supervising authority in 1988 when bolts fastening the stator coils were found broken.
Moreover, japanese Shinkansen trains show that high speed railways can be
operated over decades with virtually no severe accident.
2 Disadvantages of Transrapid:
2.1 No network building ability
For the following reasons, the maglev would hardly be able to form networks:
1. Switches (points) and crossings are extremely complicated and expensive,
2. the existing railway infrastructure (network, platforms, shops etc.) cannot
be used,
3. the important European tunnel links (Alps, English Channel and Great Belt)
cannot be used. There is no european dimension for Transrapid.
Imagine, TGV and ICE were unable to change into the existing network (like maglevs are): A trip from Hamburg to Frankfurt or Munich would be impossible. Even the superfast TGV Atlantique in great parts uses the „old“ lines. Being able to use the existing network allows high speed railways to multiply their advantage and benefit.
All Europe seeks to make fast trains compatible by standardizing gauges (spanish AVE high speed trains use regular gauge tracks), signalling systems (AVE uses LZB signalling like ICE) and by operating multi-system trains like Eurostar and Thalys.
WHEEL/RAIL-TECHNOLOGY IS THE UNIVERSAL STANDARD OF THE EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED NETWORK!
The utterly incompatible Transrapid does not fit into this system and thus is
anti-european. In this context, it’s a bit of an involuntary irony that the
Transrapid 07 test vehicle is named „Europa“.
2.2 Expensive guideway
A Transrapid guideway is a very long electric motor and therefore much more expensive than a simple steel and concrete railway track.
Shifting the expensive propulsion components from the vehicle into the guideway makes the guideway extraordinary capital intensive. This way the break-even-point is pushed far upwards. That means that a very high ridership is needed to cover the guideway’s fixed costs. The economic hazard for the investor increases. Transrapid could hardly win a competition of low fares against railways and especially against air transport, which both have much less fixed costs.
It’s a principle of traffic planning to check if costs can be cut by
shifting components from the line into the train. Examples:
· Ticket machines should be installed on the train if (for instance on a branch
line) there’s a lot of stations but only a small number of trains.
· The upcoming signalling systems that are based on GSM-standard mobile
communication (ETCS, Funkfahrbetrieb) are supposed to drastically cut costs by
installing signalling and guiding functions not in stationary devices and
switching towers but in the train’s cab.
Consequently, installing the propulsion in the guideway is no good idea.
A cost comparison: For the french TGV-lines the following amounts were
invested [4]:
· TGV Sud-Est: 2,55 billion DEM for 427 km (6 million DEM/km),
· TGV Atlantique: 2,82 billion DEM for 282 km (10 million DEM/km),
· TGV Nord: 3,9 billion DEM für 329 km (11,9 million DEM/km).
Figures around 10 million DEM/km seem typical for new high speed railway lines in France unless they don’t need too many tunnels and bridges. Maybe, in densely populated Germany with its many crossing roads, autobahns, tracks and pipes, higher amounts are necessary.
However, the costs for the existing high speed railway lines Hannover - Würzburg and Mannheim - Stuttgart (38 million DEM/km) cannot be used as a scale since they run almost 100% in tunnels or cuttings, on bridges or dams and that way are more expensive than plain country lines (as the failed Transrapid Hamburg - Berlin would have been). 1 km tunnel or viaduct cost 31 million DEM in the rough (tracks, signals, catenary not included) [4].
Figures presented by the federal german railway office (Eisenbahnbundesamt) in october, 1998 said that the flatland-Transrapid Hamburg - Berlin (with no tunnel and no viaduct) would cost around 40 million DEM/km [5].
Due to the experiences made with large scale projects in general and
especially with the Transrapid test line in Lathen, Germany, it was unlikely
that the cost assumptions for the maglev line Hamburg - Berlin would not be
exceeded.
The Transrapid test line at Lathen originally was supposed to cost 140 million
DEM. In the end, it was 750 million DEM - over 5 times more [25].
Upgrading the existing Hamburg - Berlin conventional railway line to 200/230
km/h will only cost around 1 billion DEM and lead to about 85-90 minutes
travelling time with ICE-T tilting trains [8]. The over 10 times more expensive
Transrapid (11 billion DEM) would have taken about 60 minutes.
The price for a quite marginal time-saving effect would have been a huge cost
explosion leading to a very poor ratio of costs and benefit.
2.3 Not suitable for freight transport
The freight version of Transrapid maglev can only carry 15 tons per 25m-segment while weighing 48 tons itself [9]! This is an extremely poor ratio of weight and payload. This fact is likely to lead to an energy-consumption even higher than the one of road haulage! Shifting goods from truck to freight Transrapid would not be desirable under ecologic aspects!
A conventional railway freight-car (german 60-foot-container car) weighs 20 tons and can carry a payload of 70 tons [10]. With american double stack container cars the ratio should be even better.
For the transportation of 1000 tons of goods in containers, 400 tons of
railway rolling stock are required - or 3200 tons of Transrapid.
2.4 Low line capacity
Since the guideway propulses the vehicles, a Transrapid line must be divided into sectors that can be switched and controlled separately. This fact limits the line capacity because only one vehicle can be located in one sector [20].
Advanced wheel/rail-systems do not have this limitation. Modern
computer-based signalling systems (like ETCS) allow trains to follow up in
minimum intervals, only limited by the braking ability of the following train.
2.5 High maintenance costs
The following facts are likely to cause high maintenance costs:
· the gap between guideway and vehicle must constantly be kept on 10mm. This
leads to extremely high requirements on exactness in construction and
maintenance.
· The claim that Transrapid technology is free of wear is nonsense. Wear occurs
also with contact-free transmitted dynamic forces. On the Transrapid test line
in Lathen bolts that fasten the linear motor to the guideway broke so the line
had to be closed due to safety reasons in 1988 - after only a few thousand
kilometers of test operation [25]. The magnetic forces that are required to lift
and guide the weighty vehicles and maintain the 10mm gap constant to a few
millimeters even at high speeds necessarily promote wear.
2.6 Danger to the „Bahnreform“ (deregulation, privatization of german railways)
The commitment of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) in the Transrapid project indicated that until the end of 1999 deregulation and privatization had not come far enough to allow DB free enterprise. Obviously, until the retirement of its former CEO, Johannes Ludewig, DB could still be abused for industry-political purposes.
A private, independent enterprise would never have embarked upon a business
like the failed Hamburg - Berlin maglev in which
· the hazard was that unequally divided to its debit,
· the pretended viability was that obviously and bluntly dragged in by a more
than shaky calculation,
· the (not existing) transport need had to be ordered in by a law (Magnetschwebebahnbedarfsgesetz
= „lex Transrapid“).
Lufthansa, whose privatization process has come much further, had drawn back
from Transrapid much earlier than DB did.
With its new CEO, Hartmut Mehdorn, DB obtained much more independence from
political influence. Mr. Mehdorn’s (praiseworthy) strictly commercial and
economic attitude results in low chances for prestige projects.
One of the first things Mr. Mehdorn did was cancel the Hamburg - Berlin
Transrapid!
3 Overall assessment
The pretended advantages of Transrapid compared to wheel/rail technology either turn out not to be sound or their benefit is marginal. In contrary to that, its disandvantages can be seen as „knock out-criteria“ for an economically and ecologically sensible application.
Transrapid ranges in the long queue of "special" rail systems that may have been interesting from the technocratic point of view, but which moved directly from the prototype state to the transport museum (unless they found a niche application). Examples are monorails like Alweg-train, Aérotrain, Schwebebahn and M-Bahn.
By now, Transrapid exists for about 30 years. Despite that long time and billions of subsidies it never obtained one only sale success. Probably, it’s one of the most unsuccessful industry products in technology history.
Even as a local transport system it will hardly have a breakthrough. Think of
the now proposed two lines in Germany ( Munich
airport link and Metrorapid
Dortmund - Düsseldorf ): For 220 km/h average speed (Munich) or ridiculous
120 km/h („Metrorapid“) [33] you don’t need a maglev!
Explanations and sources used:
[1] Source: Dr.-Ing. Breimeier, Rudolf: Vergleich des Energieverbrauchs von Transrapid und Eisenbahn. Eisenbahnrevue International 10/1999.
[2] Source: Bahn Extra: Bahn-Jahrbuch 99. GeraNova-Verlag München
[3] Source: Eisenbahntechnische Rundschau 10/1987 (Hestra-Verlag Darmstadt).
[4] Source: Obermayer (Hrsg.): Internationaler Schnellverkehr, Franckh-Verlag, Stuttgart 1994.
[5] The construction costs of the failed 292 km long maglev Hamburg - Berlin
originally were declared 6,1 billion DEM in the Apr. 25, 1997 financing concept
of the german federal government. This included guideway, longstator, purchase
of land, switches and project management.
However, most of the items summarized under „Betriebssystem“ (operating
system; 3,7 billion DEM) were costs for infrastructure too, namely coils for the
long stator, energy supply devices, buildings, signalling/guiding equipment.
Only the costs for the vehicles (about 700 million DEM) could be deducted. This
way, 9,1 billion DEM remained, that were 31 million DEM per kilometer.
Hiding infrastructure costs under the headline „operating system“, obviously
aimed at veiling the real amount of the costs for the Transrapid line.
The named figures were soon out of date. The federal railway office named 7,7 to
8,9 billion DEM for the guideway plus 3,9 billion DEM for the operating system (october,
1998). Vehicles deducted, this would mean 37-41 million DEM/km [30].
[6] Source: Vieregg, Rössler, Bohm: „Analyse des Energiebedarfs im Personenverkehr des Korridors Hamburg - Berlin unter Berücksichtigung des Vergleichs zwischen Transrapid und ICE“, internet-site http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/vrb/VRBHOME.htm
[8] Source: Magnetschnellbahn-Planungsgesellschaft Berlin-Hamburg: Sonderbeilage Alternativen der Rad-/Schiene-Technik. For Hamburg - Berlin Thyssen (http://www/maglev.com) names a travelling time of 94 minutes with a regular train, so 85 minutes seem plausible for a tilting train.
[9] Source: internet-site http://www.transrapid.de
[10] Source: Die Bundesbahn 10/1991 (Hestra-Verlag Darmstadt)
[12] The magnetic friction with Transrapid 06 is declared about 4.000 Newton,
the drag of the linear generator about 5.000 N (at 300 km/h) (Source: [3]).
For an equally weighty (80t) railway train with equal capacity the mechanic
friction (wheel/rail, gears, motors) would be calculated by the formula mass *
gravitation * friction coefficient for railcars:
80.000 kg * 9,81 m/s2 * 0,0021 = 1.648 N (Source of the formula: Lindner: Physik
für Ingenieure, Vieweg-Verlag, Braunschweig/Basel; Source of the coefficient:
Fiedler: Grundlagen der Bahntechnik, Werner-Verlag, Düsseldorf).
For sake of completeness be acknowledged that a (smaller) part of the
maglev-specific drag is caused (via the inductive pickup) to supply air
condition and lighting - appliances that conventional railways have, too. With
electric ICE for instance, this power requirement does not lead to drag since
the electricity needed is taken from the catenary. For Transrapid 06, [3] names
117 kW for "other consumers". At 300 km/h this would correspond to
about 1.500 N drag. Maglev-specific drag without "other
consumers" would be 4-5 times the railway-specific drag in this comparison.
[13] Source: Der Eisenbahn-Ingenieur 7/1994
[16] Source: Umweltbundesamt: Geräuschbewertung des Transrapid (UBA-Texte 25/97)
[17] Source: information by the international railway federation UIC, Paris
[18] An Airbus A320-200 with 60% occupancy consumes on the Frankfurt -
Hannover route (about 300 km, like Hamburg - Berlin) 8,5 liters/100
Passengerkilometers primary energy (gasoline-equivalent) (Source: Die Deutsche
Bahn 9-10/1993).
The planes operated on the Hamburg - Berlin route in 1997 (Fokker 50) are quoted
to consume 630 Wh/Pkm primary energy at 50 % occupancy, that is about 6,5 l/100
Pkm (Source: [6]).
Transrapid in this study totals 568 Wh/Pkm (about 6 l/100 Pkm) with 50%
occupancy, about the same figures as the airplane.
On a 1000 km long distance, in which the energy-intensive take-off loses
influence, the Airbus only needs 6,25 l/100 Pkm, with 2000 km, it’s less than
6 l.
ICE 1 (not the most modern train) consumes 2,5 l/100 Pkm primary energy (50%
occupancy) (source: Die Deutsche Bahn 9-10/1993).
Railways are the only ecologic alternative to air transport.
[19] Source: Siemens: Verkehrstechnik-Express 2/1997
[20] Source: E-Mail from Prof. Pachl of Nov. 15, 1997 to the author.
Homepage Prof. Pachl: http://www.ivev.bau.tu-bs.de/~pachl
[21] Source: Deutscher Bundestag: Bundestags-document 11/2069 „Systemvergleich zwischen Magnetschwebebahn und Rad-Schiene-Technik“ (28.3.1988)
[23] Both systems have a test track, but a commercial application is still not within sight. High costs and short public budgets are further problems. Conventional high speed railways already exist in Germany and Japan. After decades of development both projects seem "stuck". Source: Die Welt 1.10.1999, Die Welt 5.10.2000
[24] Source: „Der Transrapid ist eine Lebensversicherung für unsere Nachkommen“. Statement of the federal german ministry of transport of Apr. 25,1997
[25] Source: Franz Büllingen: Die Genese der Magnetbahn Transrapid. Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, Wiesbaden 1997
[26] Travelling time from Frankfurt central to Cologne central: 58 minutes.
For the (shorter) section Frankfurt airport to Cologne airport deduct
· 13 minutes for the section from Frankfurt central to Frankfurt airport,
· about 5 min. for the travelling time difference between the sections Cologne
central to Cologne south airport junction and Cologne airport to Cologne south
airport junction.
[29] Hans Georg Ungefug: Luftverkehrsanalyse 1998. Published in: DBProjekt: Zum Thema Neubaustrecke Köln - Rhein/Main 1/98. Hestra-Verlag, Darmstadt.
[30] Source: Berliner Morgenpost October 18, 1998.
[31] Source: Der Eisenbahn-Ingenieur 12/1997.
[32] Source: Der Eisenbahn-Ingenieur 4/1998.
[33] Source: Süddeutsche Zeitung 27.10.2000.
[35] Source: Focus Online 20.6.1998
[36] For the sake of completeness, it must be said that Transrapid 07 in 1997
was equipped with a fairing for the cleft inside of its levitation racks. This
way, aerodynamic noise was reduced to some extent [37].
A comparison of this „hushkit-Transrapid“ with the ICE would not be fair
until ICE was equipped with hushkits, too. ICE’s bogies are explicitly
prepared for the mounting of noise abatement fairings [38].
[37] Source: Eisenbahntechnische Rundschau 12/1997.
[38] Source: Münchschwander, Jänsch, Rump: Das Hochgeschwindigkeitssystem der Deutschen Bundesbahn.
[39] Source: Thyssen Technische Berichte 1/1988
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